

1964

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

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Castro's overt offense was worse than Nasser's. He confiscated American property worth a billion dollars. But where Nasser arranged to pay for the canal out of tolls, Castro gave only the vaguest suggestions that he might, sometime, pay.

Looking down, Aristophanes might even profess to understand why, after the Bay of Pigs, Castro decided to take all the arms he could get from Khrushchev. If that meant the risk of storing offensive missiles, the price was acceptable, but it is debatable whether Castro preferred it that way.

In any event, Washington's hopes of undermining Castro's regime into economic collapse were jolted first by Canada's bland announcement that \$33 million in wheat would be sent to Cuba, and now by the sale of British buses.

The British, still smarting from their 1956 debacle, observed wryly that their selling surplus buses to Cuba was hardly a greater crime than U.S. sales of surplus wheat to the Soviet.

The grumbling of the State Department over the British defection is based on the fact that the mere existence of a Communist regime in Cuba corrodes our whole political and economic position in this hemisphere. It makes reforms projected under the Alliance for Progress appear to be the slowest and most expensive means of dispossessing the haves.

Thus there are two sharp edges to our problem of Cuba. One is that for years and many billions of dollars we have been contending that hunger and a draggy economy drive people to communism. So when somebody relieves the hunger and economic pinch, we complain that this will strengthen communism.

The other edge is that we remain unable to find a nice, pious, high-sounding, moral reason for swatting Castro that will keep the rest of the world from sounding like the United States in defense of Nasser.

That is what Aristophanes was giggling about.

Vietnam Crisis

SPEECH
OF

HON. F. BRADFORD MORSE

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, January 31, 1964

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, the overthrow by a military junta of the military junta which overthrew the Diem regime in South Vietnam dramatizes once again the deteriorating situation in southeast Asia and points up more sharply the need for hard data about the progress of the war.

Whether out of confusion or design the administration has issued this week alone no less than three conflicting accounts of the Vietnam crisis. On Monday the Secretary of Defense reported gloomily to the House Armed Services Committee that the Vietcong Communist guerrillas have made considerable progress since the fall of the Diem regime. On Tuesday, the Secretary told a press conference that there has been a very noticeable improvement in the operations.

At this point in the review, the Washington Post called the administration statements a retreat from candor and called for an end to the verbal ambiguity on Vietnam.

Not to be deterred, however, the Secretary told the Armed Services Committee Wednesday:

The new Government . . . has considerably more popular support than its predecessor and the military revolutionary committee is beginning to take action to intensify military operations and to improve civil administration.

At that very moment, the military revolutionary committee was being ousted by military dissidents who accused the ruling generals of negotiating with France to neutralize Vietnam. I am confused by this turn of events and I think the American people are also confused. As the Washington Post suggested in its editorial:

Isn't it time for the administration to show more faith in the intelligence and good sense of the American people?

We know that some 15,500 American military troops and advisors and technicians are in South Vietnam. Beyond that we know little. The highly touted strategic hamlet defense system is generally agreed to be in shambles. The Vietcong have made military advances in recent weeks and have killed and wounded more men and captured more weapons than the anti-Communist forces.

James Reston put the matter well this week when he wrote that the "first casualty in every war is truth" and commented that the official statements on Vietnam are "so confusing that nobody can quite make out what the official view of the war actually is." I think that the Congress and the people of the United States must be told the facts about the situation in Vietnam. If the administration, as it increasingly appears, does not know what is going on, we must be told why we do not know. With all the Americans present in the country, with a direct line from Saigon to Washington, someone must have the facts and they should be presented clearly and objectively if the administration expects to retain support for its operations in Vietnam.

Under unanimous consent, I include the Post editorial of Wednesday, January 29, and the column of James Reston which appeared in the New York Times and the Boston Herald-Traveler of the same date in the Appendix of the RECORD:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
Jan. 29, 1964]

RETREAT FROM CANDOR

On Monday, Secretary of Defense McNamara told the House Armed Services Committee that the situation in South Vietnam remains grave and added: "I must report that they [the Communists] have made considerable progress since the coup." But on Tuesday, at a press conference, Mr. McNamara seemed to nullify his earlier comments by stressing that there "has been a very noticeable improvement" in the conduct of the war and that he was "encouraged by the progress of the last 2 weeks."

Verbal ambiguity is an old story on Vietnam. Americans, it seems, must be told that the war in that country is hard and difficult—but that it is getting better. This is an old story; the French generals in Indochina made comments that sound very much the same.

As late as 1960, it was insisted that there

was no guerrilla problem in South Vietnam, even though village chiefs were being slaughtered daily. A year ago, the Diem regime was praised as the shining hope of freedom and the strategic hamlet program was extolled as a cure-all for the guerrilla disease. Now we know that the Diem regime was widely detested, and Mr. McNamara concedes that in the vital delta area the hamlet program was overextended.

Throughout, there is the impression that the administration is reluctant to tell the American people the unadorned truth—that the Vietnam war is being fought on terrain favorable to the guerrillas and that the outlook for clear-cut military victory is bleak. Thus every pessimistic report must be followed, as Mr. McNamara demonstrated with his Tuesday remarks, by optimistic exhortations.

Isn't it time for the administration to show more faith in the intelligence and good sense of the American people?

[From the Boston (Mass.) Herald-Traveler,
Jan. 29, 1964]

McNAMARA ADDS TO VIET CONFUSION
(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON.—The first casualty in every war is truth, and the war in Vietnam has been no exception. Only now is the Pentagon confirming the gloomy newspaper reports it was denying last autumn, but its official statements are still so confusing that nobody can quite make out what the official view of the war actually is.

Secretary of Defense McNamara, for example, said Tuesday at a news conference that he was encouraged by the progress of the last 2 weeks.

POLICY IN DOUBT

Monday, however, McNamara told the House Armed Services Committee that the situation in Vietnam continues grave and "I must report that they [the Communists] have made considerable progress since the coup" against the Diem government last November.

These two statements are not necessarily contradictory, but the rest of Secretary McNamara's written statement to the committee not only illustrates the change in the official line since last fall, but also leaves doubt about whether the Johnson administration is preparing to pull out of Vietnam or step up the pace of the war.

Last fall, the Kennedy administration was both trying to bring down the Diem government and complaining about reports that newspaper correspondents there on its efforts to bring that government down.

The official complaint then was that the reporters, particularly David Halberstam, of the New York Times, and Neil Sheehan, of United Press International, were concentrating on the political events in the capital of Saigon and ignoring the fact that the war was going well out in the country.

DIFFERENT TUNE

Monday, in contrast, Secretary McNamara said "the Vietcong [Communists] was quick to take advantage of the growing opposition to the Diem government and the period of uncertainty after its overthrow. Vietcong activities were already increasing in September and continued to increase at an accelerated rate in October and November, particularly in the delta area. And I must report that they have made considerable progress since the coup."

Despite this analysis, the White House announced last October 2, after Secretary McNamara's return from Saigon, "the military program in South Vietnam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought."

The White House statement added that 1,000 U.S. military personnel were being withdrawn by the end of 1963 and that "the

major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel."

WAIT DRY SEASON

Monday, however, McNamara, while defending this statement, both hoped that the Vietnamese could win the war by themselves and indicated that the United States might have to intervene with all necessary measures within our capability.

"We hope that," he said, "with our full support, the new government can take hold and eventually suppress the Vietcong insurrection. The dry season will give us a firmer basis for this judgment. However, the survival of an independent government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of all of southeast Asia and to the free world, that I can conceive of no alternative other than to take all necessary measures within our capability to prevent a Communist victory."

It may be that so many official statements on Vietnam have been so misleading in the past that observers here are seeing contradictions in McNamara's testimony that don't exist. But if the situation is grave and the Secretary of Defense can talk openly about even the possibility of taking all necessary measures within our capability, then the time has come for a much wider inquiry into the government's intentions.

If the situation is grave why are troops being withdrawn? If the Secretary of Defense is encouraged by the progress of the last 2 weeks, why is he talking about taking all measures within our capability.

This would amount to a wholly new policy. Gradually, the United States has got sucked deeper and deeper into the bog in South Vietnam. First, we were training the Vietnamese, then flying them in combat, usually without any clear knowledge among the American people about what was going on.

President Johnson has said nothing about this, and neither has Secretary of State Rusk, but it would be nice to know if any new intervention is now being considered.

Modern Warfare: Nonnuclear Style

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JOHN O. MARSH, JR.

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, January 31, 1964

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, while the dreadful capacity for destruction inherent in nuclear warfare has contributed to our shaky preservation, so far, from the holocaust of a global contest of arms, the ugly pockmarks of localized war testify grimly that the danger of a catastrophic escalation into nuclear battle has not deterred aggressors against freedom from resort to deadly combat with modernized versions of conventional weapons and tactics.

The war we fear most is nuclear war, but while we invest heavily in nuclear deterrent capacity, it is important that we keep in mind that the wars now being fought, and those in danger of flaring up in a score of locations around the globe, can be bloody, protracted, costly in lives and materiel.

Counter guerrilla warfare, as in Vietnam, presents problems of peculiar difficulty. They have been under continuing study by Dr. James D. Atkinson of

Georgetown University. He has set down some of his observations in the January-February 1964 issue of *Ordnance*, the journal of the American Ordnance Association.

Under leave to extend my remarks in the Appendix, Mr. Speaker, I include the text of Dr. Atkinson's article, as follows:

COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE

(By Dr. James D. Atkinson)

In the coming decade it may be expected that the world will continue to be faced with neither peace nor war, but with a mixture of both peace and war. This is underscored by the testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives on January 30, 1963.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that "there has been no change in the policy of the Soviet Union to encourage what Mr. Khrushchev calls wars of national liberation or popular revolts, and which we know as covert armed aggression, guerrilla warfare, and subversion."

The Secretary of Defense was no less emphatic with reference to specific areas of the world. Thus he noted that the pattern of guerrilla warfare in southeast Asia was a long-term problem. He indicated that "the situation in Laos is still quite precarious. We have withdrawn our military advisers and training missions but we have as yet no assurance that the other side has done the same."

And the situation in Vietnam also was one, he said, that probably would not yield to short-term solutions, for "victory over the Vietcong will most likely take many years."

The careful assessment of the Secretary of Defense would seem to indicate that a broad approach to the subject of guerrilla warfare is necessary. Guerrilla war is not simply a political or a military problem. It is, instead, a psychopolitical, a military, an economic, and a technological problem of a serious nature.

It would be fatuous to attempt to deemphasize the importance of the individual person in guerrilla warfare. The Communist cadre, for example, would refute this no less than the dedicated freedom fighter in the non-Communist ranks.

Equally, however, it would be rash to disregard the significance of the application of technology to particular problems. Those nations or those societies which do this more quickly and more surely than their opposite numbers inevitably will obtain an ascendancy over the course of events in world politics.

Dr. L. V. Berkner, president of the Graduate Research Center of the Southwest, indicated the far-reaching importance of today's technological revolution when he stated that "nations that fail to capture the spirit and needs of revolutionary times have been submergered by peoples who are in tune with the forces of progress."

The attempt to apply technology to guerrilla warfare is not new. During the 1920's the British experimented with aircraft and wheeled vehicles (armored cars and trucks) in irregular warfare in Nejed and Iraq. Then, too, technology played a not unimportant part in the guerrilla and resistance warfare that took place during the Second World War.

But it was not until what might be called the quantum jump in technology that occurred in the post-World War II period that technological advances offered so much promise for application to guerrilla warfare.

Many advanced ground and amphibian vehicles (for example, the plenum air track vehicle, the Gamma Goat, etc.) are under development, but the limitations of space preclude a discussion of land vehicles or amphibians in this article.

The almost bewildering varieties of tech-

nological applications are such that I should like to discuss in this paper—and then only in an exploratory way—three aspects of technological application to guerrilla warfare: (1) Aircraft and air-cushion vehicles, (2) intelligence, and (3) chemical agents.

Air-cushion vehicles, with the capability of skimming over land or water surfaces, offer highly promising advantages for operations in roadless areas.

Helicopters already have been employed with much success in today's guerrilla warfare, but their potential is far from being realized. Technological advances are such that during the next few years we can expect helicopters to have an average cruise speed of about 200 knots, a payload of 8,000 pounds, and an operating radius of 150 nautical miles.

The advanced fighter (or support) helicopter also would appear to offer some decided advantages in counter guerrilla operations. Heavier payloads will permit the mounting of 7.62-millimeter machineguns and rockets and the carrying of napalm bombs. New metals, plastic, and techniques can be expected to provide protection for personnel and vital parts in attack helicopters.

In a confrontation of a small air-mobile counter guerrilla force with a large number of guerrillas, for example, the employment of rockets and napalm bombs could be expected to render many of the guerrillas harmless and also have a considerable psychological impact on the survivors' further will to resist.

VTOL's and STOL's also are on the threshold of significant advances in capabilities. The state of the art is such that a 10,000-pound payload should be feasible by 1968-67. This would, of course, confer decided advantages in ferrying missions, close-support operation, reconnaissance, and search and rescue missions.

It is not suggested that there is a conflict between helicopters and vertical takeoff and landing and short takeoff and landing aircraft. Rather they can be employed in complementary fashion.

Possibly the most important task in counter guerrilla warfare is to strike at their bases and headquarters. This is more than ever true as regards Communist guerrillas since the cadres (who provide the command, control, and psychopolitical stimulation) are the keys to the Communist guerrilla movements.

Guerrilla bases and headquarters or command and control centers must be attacked repeatedly and with celerity. Higher speeds, greater ranges, and greater payloads all combine to place more close-support fire and more counter guerrilla forces and their weapons on the target area within a shorter time span. The result is that the reaction-dispersal time of the guerrillas will be considerably reduced.

One has only to study guerrilla case histories of the Second World War, of postwar Greece and Malaya, and of today's Viet Cong to appreciate how vital is the cutting of this reaction time.

The experience of the French in Indo-China has shown that mobility alone is not sufficient in counter guerrilla operations. The desideratum is intelligence-directed mobility. While information may be collected in a number of ways, improved types of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft offer significant advantages in acquiring data on counter guerrilla operations. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance can be used both to provide original information and to verify intelligence from other sources.

Further developments in aerial photography and in sensing devices can be expected to have great value in counter guerrilla operations. Thus, for example, the continued development of heat-sensing devices might be employed to locate guerrilla